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4. Max Weber, Joseph Needham,
Benjamin Nelson: The Question of
Chinese Science
N. Sivin

Making the insights of Max Weber and Joseph Needham overlap to
illuminate the comparative sociology of science was the last of Benjamin
Nelson's many exuberant enthusiasms. When he died unexpectedly in
1977 this great sociologist left a series of essays on what he called
civilizational analysis. Four of these publications remarked on the
contributions of Joseph Needham as Nelson saw them from a viewpoint
nurtured in the traditions of Weber, Durkheim, and Sir Henry Maine. l I
often found it a source of pleasure and stimulation to hold discourse on
Chinese science with Benjamin Nelson, both privately and on several
occasions when we shared a podium, over the last five years of his life. I
believe that it will be appropriate for me to consider what he had to say,
and to suggest some directions in which the inquiry he began might
proceed.
The juxtaposition of Weber and Needham is obvious enough on a
superficial level. To paraphrase Nelson, they more than any other scholar
of this century have revealed on an ample scale the need for, and have
shown the way toward, a systematic comparison of civilizations seen as
the largest effective units of human thought and action.
On closer examination the similarity is a great deal less obvious, for two
reasons that it is difficult to ignore. One is that Weber's concern is
capitalism and Needham's is natural science, technology, and mathematics.
These interests are, of course, not mutually exclusive, as we would expect
of two scholars so motivated by the urgency of present-day dilemmas in
which both economic systems and technical activity play such central
parts. Weber remarked more than once on science as one of many
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structures of rationalization. Bourgeois capitalism, as it emerged in the
free cities of late medieval Italy, appears to Needham to have been a
necessary condition to "bring to fusion point the formerly separated
disciplines of mathematics and nature-knowledge." Thus he is convinced
that "the failure of the rise of the merchant class to power in the State lies
at the basis of the inhibition of the rise of modern science in Chinese
society."2
Still there can be no doubt that Weber would have found these
propositions of Needham's unsatisfactory, as unabashed instances of
materialist explanation. Needham is not at all oblivious to non-material
factors; in fact he has drawn attention to several that previously had been
overlooked. What interests him in the long run, however, is not Weber's
interplay of values and social action but the preponderance of one kind of
factor over the other: "In sum, I believe that the analysable differences in
social and economic pattern between China and Western Europe will in
the end illuminate, as far as anything can throw light on it, both the earlier
predominance of Chinese science and technology and also the later rise
of modern science in Europe alone."3
Conversely, Weber's various assertions about Chinese science so
inadequately reflect the soundest knowledge readily available about
1910 that he must have been satisfied with casual reading on the topic.
Consider this famous passage from The Religion oj China (KonJuzianismus
und Taoismus):
The scientific claims of Confucianism were no less modest. The
development of mathematics had progressed to trigonometry, but
this soon decayed because it was not used. Confucius evidently had
no knowledge of the precession of the equinoxes which had been
known in the Middle East for a long time. The office of the court
astronomer, that is the calendar maker, must be distinguished from
the court astrologer who was both an annalist and an influential
adviser. The former was a carrier of secret knowledge and his office.
was hereditarily transmitted. But relevant knowledge can hardly
have developed, witness the great success of the Jesuits' European
instruments. Natural science as a whole remained purely empirical.
Only quotations seem to have been preserved from the old
botanical, that is pharmacological work, allegedly the work of an
emperor. 4
Every sentence in this passage is incorrect. Every sentence could have
been corrected from sources available ca. 1915. 5
Needham on capitalism, and Weber on science, did not draw on the
best learning within their reach, despite their thoroughness with respect
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to their own abiding themes. 6 Each found the preoccupation of the other
important as an issue, but negligible as an element in research design.
The overlap between their arguments and conclusions is thus less than
one would expect it to be, given Weber's concern about rationalization
and Needham's desire to be precise about the conditions under which
modern science emerged.
There is a second reason to retain some doubt about the affinity of
Weber and Needham. So far in Needham's books on Chinese science, in
440 pages of index and 911 pages of bibliography, Max Weber does not
appear once. This is remarkable considering the pervasiveness of
Weber's influence, and Needham's scope of reference. At one point in a
discussion of capitalism as a motive force in European history, Needham
does suggest that "in the end it will probably be found that all the schools,
whether the Weberians, or the Marxists, or the believers in intellectual
factors alone, will have their contribution to make."? This is hardly an
acknowledgement of a major intellectual debt. It is therefore necessary to
ask whether in bringing the two together Nelson was not serving as
matchmaker for a shotgun wedding.

THE ISSUES
The answer is no. When Nelson repeatedly speaks of "Needham's
challenges" he means that, if we consider Weber's intention to account
through comparisons for the uniqueness of the European transition to
modernity, Needham has demonstrated insufficiencies in Weber's method
of approach. He has done so without, as I have said, discussing Weber's
work.
Nelson acknowledges several respects in which Needham has carried
us further toward sound solutions to the problems Weber has raised. He
sees in turn certain limitations in the directions Needham has taken in
this effort. These prompt Nelson to turn back to Weber and find in his late
writings "clues" which suggest that more adequate replies to "Needham's
challenges" may be constructed within the Weberian tradition. To
construct them became, in fact, the preoccupation of Nelson's last five
years of life. But his final word remained unsaid, and we are left with
suggestions.
Needham's Challenge. Nelson identifies Needham's challenge in the
form of two propositions. The first is encompassed by the opening
paragraphs of The Grand Titration: "Apart from the great ideas and
systems of the Greeks, between the first and the fifteenth centuries the
Chinese, who experienced no 'dark ages,' were generally much in
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advance of Europe; and not until the scientific revolution of the late
Renaissance did Europe draw rapidly ahead. Before that time, however,
the West had been profoundly affected not only in its technical processes
but in its very social structures and changes by discoveries and inventions
emanating from China and East Asia.... Why, then, did modern science,
as opposed to ancient and medieval science (with all that modern science
implied in terms of political dominance), develop only in the Western
world?"8
Nelson does not accept these claims uncritically; in fact he sees no
evidence that Chinese superiority in technology can be extrapolated to
what he calls "high-level science."9 As we will see, he also places the
takeoff of Europe long before "the scientific revolution of the Renaissance."
Even so, Nelson recognizes the bearing of Needham's larger demonstration
on Weber's differential typology. Weber, as Nelson says in another
connection, "shied away from dynamic processual analyses of changes ...
in the structures of consciousness." The potentiality that Weber finds
unique to the West is unique from the time of the Greeks, at least in germ.
What he finds missing in China is missing for the past two thousand
years-a period that he does not feel the need to subdivide systematicallyand is at best flawed even earlier. Although toward the end of his life
Weber became more concerned about "historic rationalizations of
science and sensibility," he did not, except by hints, account for the
processes by which the uniqueness of the West came about. lo His
discussions of change tend to be kinematic, concerned with factors visible
in states of society before and after a transition, rather than dynamic,
concerned with the ways forces drive events in flux.
Needham is attempting to document Chinese superiority in enterprises
that have become the very nucleus of modern civilization. He is
suggesting that Europe, rather than being the fated winner in the race to
modernity, would have appeared a thousand years ago to be an unlikely
contender. The question of Europe's ascendancy cannot be resolved by
typology; it is a squarely historical question. That is Needham's first
challenge.
For the second challenge Nelson points to a long passage in which
Needham states that the Renaissance science that the Jesuits carried to
China in the seventeenth century was, unlike the science of an earlier
time, no longer "European" or "Western," but rather universal and
modern. The missionaries represented it as Western, for they wanted its
superiority to be identified as the cultural superiority of Christendom,
"but the Chinese understood clearly that it was primarily 'new.' " I I
Nelson is aware, in citing more recent studies based on the Jesuits'
Chinese writings, that the science they were constrained by their church
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to carry was anything but universal and modern. The Tychonic world
system of Tycho Brahe was adopted by the Society of Jesus in the 1620s as
part of the Counter-Reformation resistance to cosmological revolution.
The physics, geology, meteorology, and other sciences that the missionaries outlined in Chinese were already obsolete in those parts of
Europe that were free to choose.1 2
Again a larger point commands attention. In constructing his typologies
Weber treats each civilization as a discrete unit, even though he is aware
that their borders were permeable and changing. This is perhaps
inevitable in view of his concern with ideal types. In any case Needham's
emphasis throughout his work, by contrast, is on the ecumenical and
world-wide origin of modern science. In his reconstruction of history
there is no Western tradition, or Chinese tradition, that can be discussed
without reference to impulses passing to and fro across frontiers.
Encounters with people, goods, and ideas that have crossed those
borders play an essential role in every subdivision of Needham's work.
His systematic discourses on the transmission of acupuncture or of
conceptions of alchemical immortality are among his most precise and
original contributions. The Jesuits' epicycles and tables oflogarithms, and
Chinese responses to them, constitute merely the last of innumerable
encounters that Needham evaluates.
In these encounters Nelson identifies a second challenge. It is a
challenge to encompass contacts between civilizations. It draws the
attention of Weber's successors to the inevitable press of modern
rationalization toward the universal, toward abolishing every local
particularity until at the end of the process, if it is ever reached, even the
word" civilization" can no longer be used in the plural.
Needham's Contribution. In addition to these critical challenges, the
major substantive contribution of Needham to the Weberian enterprise
was of course to document the importance of science in shaping the
destinies of East and West, and the importance of religion and other
cultural factors in shaping the fate of science. This Nelson sees as
congruent with Weber's emphasis in his final writings, especially in his
introduction to the Gesammelte AUfsiitze zur Religionssoziologie, on the
uniqueness of Western science. 13 Nelson points in his various writings to
two other useful insights of Needham. 14 The first is a coupling between
mercantile culture and the mathematization of hypotheses, in this
assertion from Science and Civilisation in China:
It may well be that concurrent social and economic changes supervening only in Europe formed the milieu in which natural science
could raise at last above the level of the higher artisanate, the semi-
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mathematical technicians. The reduction of all quality to quantities,
the affirmation of a mathematical reality behind all appearances, the
proclaiming of a space and time uniform throughout all the
universe; was it not analogous to the merchant's standard of value?
No goods or commodities, no jewels or monies there were, but such
as could be computed and exchanged in number, quantity and
measure. IS
Although this turns out to be precisely the causal relationship between
capitalism and rationalization that Weber set out to refute, it prompts a
stimulating search by Needham for its negative counterpart in China. The
second contribution is a contrast between the ideas of law in Europe and
China that pointed out the absence in China of a notion of laws of nature,
decreed and guaranteed by a divine legislator. 16
Nelson acknowledges that "Needham is not content to rest his case
upon a single or simple formula,"17 but suggests that his work is vitiated
by the tendency to see capitalism as a cause, and the attempt to
extrapolate superiority from technology to science, that I have already
mentioned. He remarks on Needham's lack of interest in sociological
theory, which leads him to overlook such important W eberian themes as
the formative character of urban life and the complexity of rationalization
as a dynamic force. He also notes that, aside from one or two perceptive
passages, Needham overlooks the positive role of religion and theology
in the West-the transition in theology and law to new structures of
consciousness and a new relation of nature to man, that made the
scientific revolution possible later. It is in fact on this ground that Nelson
counter-challenges Needham's challenge concerning historical process.
Weber, Nelson reminds us, did not assume that changes in economic
and technological priorities will necessarily lead to greater transitions.
Modernity is not the result of a linear increase of rationalization, but of
successive" charismatic" breakthroughs to new modes of rationalization.
Scientific knowledge can arise in any social circumstances; in China it
certainly existed, but lacked a metaphysical basis-or so Weber concluded.
What prompts change is the "technical utilization" of knowledge, which
may be encouraged by capitalism wherever the latter exists, but which
becomes pOSSible only in connection with "universalizing and universalistic modes of thought and sensibility." Weber does not ask when
these arise, and as a result of what process; Needham does, but his
answer, Nelson argues, puts them too late. The crucial period that
expanded the possibilities of European science is in the 12th and 13th
centuries. 18
Nelson's own studies in historical sociology led him to believe that in
the 12th and 13th centuries Europeans crystallized rationalizing and
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rationalized structures of consciousness, orientations, and institutions
that rest on the "concrete individual person and the objective universal."
These structures were the result of efforts in the law and in the
universities to institutionalize reason and dialectic, to harmonize these
with faith and to produce an "intelligible cosmos ... and rational world
united in all its spheres."19 The Schoolmen thus maintained a lively
interest in Nature; most of the great medieval figures that historians of
science study today were theologians by vocation. Their contribution was
more than the speculation about impetus, intension and remission of
forms, and so on, and the few experiments in magnetism and optics, that
Needham has long since acknowledged. 20 It amounts to an institutional
framework into which a vastly expanded scientific discourse could fit.
Their stimulus came, of course, from the recovery of Greek and Roman
learning. The twelfth and thirteenth centuries were in fact building on
"the universalities of Greek philosophy and science, the universalities of
Roman law and political theory." The evolution of modern science, for
Nelson as for Weber, is traced in the vicissitudes of the Greek heritage.
Without its influence, they are convinced, no universally valid scientific
knowledge, backed by a vivifying metaphysics, has ever existed. The
twelfth and thirteenth centuries represent, in Nelson's view, a unique
discontinuity in the history of this legacy. In the "fraternizing" atmosphere
of medieval cities it was combined once and for all with Christianity's
universalization of human brotherhood. The result was a setting for
widening exploratory debates that have continued to the present. 21

Further Challenges
That was how far Nelson was able to carry his response to Needham's
challenges. There is no doubt that, given more time, he would have dealt
substantively with the issue of encounters between civilizations, and
would have further developed the arguments that I have just summarized
through his growing acquaintance with Chinese science. Let me finally
suggest how they might be further developed.
The Scientific Revolution Problem. For Weber comparative studies were
necessary to explain the uniqueness of Western institutions. They made
possible a typology of the reciprocal relations between ideas and social
possibilities. Even more fundamental, one must first know what is
missing elsewhere if one is to make what Weber called "a clearer genetic
comparison of the historical uniqueness of European cultural development."22 It is not that Europe furnishes the only development worth
studying for its own sake, but that Weber's concern is to create "an
empirical science of concrete reality" (Wirklichkeitswissenschaft). His aim,
he goes on to say, "is that understanding of the characteristic uniqueness
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of the reality in which we move." This is neither cultural bias nor pretended
disinterestedness, but rather a commitment to the affairs of his own
time. 23 It gives the historical realities of Europe a poignancy by contrast to
which Weber sees Chinese civilization as exotic.
This enduring focus on Europe needs to be kept in mind as we
contemplate Weber's interest in why capitalism did not develop
autochthonously in China, and as we consider alongside it Needham's
contagious curiosity about why modern science did not first appear in
China. It has seldom been noticed how inherently problematic these
queries are. They are examples of a type of question that has not been
asked in science since the time of Leibniz, and that fastidious historians in
this century have tended to avoid and to teach their students to avoid.
Why does a body not fall with a speed proportional to the cube of the
elapsed time? Why is France not a socialist state? Why was your
automobile not stolen from the curb last night as you were sleeping?
These translate into questions about what actually is the case. They can
only be answered by an account of what did happen. Such questions
continue to be asked, of course, because of their heuristic value. They
arouse interest in a topic and provide some initial order for thinking
about it. As we comprehend it better they tend to grow murky. Finally
they lose their interest compared with the emerging clarity of what did
happen.
Although the aims of Weber and Needham clearly are heuristic, their
particular questions remain problematic. On what ground can we assume
that people in other civilizations wanted or were unconsciously working
toward economic systems or scientific theories of a modern type? If they
were not, on what ground can we speak of their values or institutions
"handicapping" or "hindering" these developments, as Weber does,24 or
"inhibiting" them, as Needham and writers inspired by him do?
Sociological Perspectives. One of the most impressive results of juxtaposing
the writings of Weber and Needham, both of them scholars committed to
social frames of reference, is to see how relentlessly unsociological they
are when they consider China. I presume that sociology, even of the sort
most purely devoted to cognition, is concerned with what identifiable
collectivities share. These collectivities need not be united in space or
time, but their membership must be definable. The study of a disembodied
idea extant only in an ancient classic may belong to either philosophy or
intellectual history, but can be considered sociological only if sooner or
later the idea takes on a special meaning for an identifiable collectivity.
By the first century B. C. the central notions of the Analects, the Lao-tzu,
and so on, had become the common property of Chinese culture. I need
not repeat my detailed arguments about the confusions that have sprung
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from Sinologists' consistently ambiguous use of the words "Confucianism"
and "Taoism."25 The consequences of this ambiguity are visible in Weber's
writing, as they are in Needham's. Weber's tendencies to reify "Confucianism" so that it becomes the subject of active verbs, and to treat it as
shorthand for" dominant social and political forces" of many kinds were
characteristic of Sinological usage at the time he wrote.
We have made a little progress in recent decades. More precision of the
same kind, applied to the relations between values and social change, can
further strengthen Weber's heritage.
Our understanding of science as a class of rationalizations in China can
also benefit from concern with who was doing it. Most writing on social
aspects of Chinese science and technology has been concerned with
individuals, with abstract sets such as all those who would agree with
some sentiment of Lao-tzu or Chuang-tzu, or with members of socioeconomic classes. 26 More attention might be given to lineages (which in
science as in religion are determined by the transmission of a charismatic
text) and to the few coherent occupational groups that can be identified,
such as court astronomers and physicians. Attention of this sort has
recently led to several findings that change the conventional picture of
Chinese science:
1. There was no science in traditional China, only sciences. Contrary
to the picture that Weber drew from his sources, these were sophisticated
enough that we can evaluate them on the same level as their contemporary
European counterparts until the seventeenth century. Which were better
and which worse remains a matter of opinion. But they were not
integrated by anything corresponding to the scientia of the West. Scientia
was, after all, born and maintained in social institutions, from the
Academy and Lyceum to the medieval universities, that subordinated
science to philosophy. This was not the case in China. 27
2. As we might suspect from the first point, the advancement of
science in China cannot be attributed to Taoists by any socially
meaningful definition of the latter word. Alchemy is the only science
particularly associated with Taoist sects. What chemical processes and
what chemical knowledge originated in alchemy, and what was borrowed
from medicine and the chemical arts to be applied toward macrobiotic
and meditational ends? That question remains entirely open. Conversely,
in the sciences generally, most famous contributions were made by
conventional people who followed civil service careers. In technology
they were made by craftsmen whose religious affiliations on the whole
remain unknown.
3. Theoretical scientific endeavors existed in China, and customarily
overlapped those aimed toward practical goals. Recognition that this was

Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 1985

9

Comparative Civilizations Review, Vol. 10 [1985], No. 10, Art. 6
46

CIVILIZA TlONS EAST AND WEST

the case has been milch delayed by the failure of Sinologists to study
systematically theoretical and metaphysical writings, on the ground that
any discourse about yin-yang and the Five Phases must be gobbledygook
or flim-flam. Incompetent translations of medical writings have merely
reinforced this conviction. But like other Chinese documents, those of
theoretical science yield to the scholarship that Giorgio de Santillana
defined as "the art of reading slowly."2s
From these writings emerges a conviction that bears on any sociology
of cognition. Their authors did not believe that empirical investigation
integrated by theory could completely explain physical phenomena. It
could yield useful answers to any practical question, but the texture of
reality is too fine and too subtle to be completely apprehended by extending
the senses. For access to the inwardness of Nature, means are readily at
hand, namely introspection, contemplation, or a leap of intuition,
depending on the teaching of various traditions. These means are complementary to those of science, a point that affects both. 29
The Marginality of Revolutionary Change. My final point is a corollary of
the preceding one. If we consider the process that underlies Weber's leap
from tradition to modernity, we notice that he is studying a group of
European sects that we see emerging from the margins of society to
change the world around them, or disappear, or both. It is precisely their
marginality-and a transitional situation that furnishes them with
openings to a mutable center-that lets them be revolutionary. In this
focus on the edges of society Weber differs crucially from Nelson, whose
schoolmen of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries become the intellectual
establishment of Catholic Europe soon after they appear.
When Weber's gaze shifts to China it quickly becomes fixed on the elite
and its literary heritage, both what it drew from Confucius and what it
drew from Lao-tzu. His Confucians and Taoists, like Needham's, are too
often the same people. Occasionally Weber glances toward the outer
reaches of society-with his tendency to see the last two thousand years
in one featureless blur-but his eyes are soon forced back by a prospect
of irrationality and unredeemed traditionalism that only the shock of
Westernization could possibly break through. Here again we see Weber's
sound instincts thwarted by the limitations of his sources. A great deal is
explained by his statement that "the sociologist essentially depends on
the literature of missionaries. This certainly varies in value but in the last
analysis remains relatively the most authentic."lo
The issue of marginality turns out to be equally important with respect
to scientific revolutions. That is perhaps the most important conclusion
that we can readily draw in connection with Needham's second challenge,
in which the Jesuits typify the encounter between civilizations. Indian
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astronomers in the eighth century; Islamic astronomers from Central
Asia in the thirteenth century; Christian missionaries around 1600: all
brought versions of Ptolemaic astronomy and Aristotelian cosmology
that could have precipitated revolutionary changes. The Jesuits did so,
but only in astronomy, not in society. Their teaching was confined to the
elite, to people whose first thought was for the preservation and
revivification of their own culture. If we seek in China those for whom
science was not a means to conservative ends, for whom one proven fact
could in principle outweigh the whole body of millennial values, we do
not find them until the late nineteenth century. By that time foreigners
exempt from Chinese law and backed by gunboats had educated them
and given them prospects of careers. We can no longer talk about the
encounter of the old and new astronomy. Social and political change had
left nothing for the old to do. Chinese astronomy was no longer taught.
CONCLUSION
These reflections suggest that Needham's challenges remain on the
whole intact. In identifying them Benjamin Nelson made a most
important contribution to the sociology that builds on Weber's avoidance
of reductionism. Nelson's answer to the first challenge, the challenge to
explain process, carried our attention back to the notion of scientia that
began to evolve in European circumstances as soon as the stimulus of
Islamic classicism was felt in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. It did
not come to grips with Needham's important point that by 1635 the
Schoolmen had come to constitute a disciplined opposition to emerging
modern science. In this transition lies a most fundamental question of
social process. Let those who must now face this question remember the
ebullient and tenacious man whose explorations have led them to see the
issues in that way.
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